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Vs: Mielenkiintoisia NBA-tilastoja
[quote author="http://offthedribble.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/same-numbers-two-views-of-fernandez/"]Same Numbers, Two Views of Fernandez
By Rob Mahoney
On draft night, the Dallas Mavericks traded away a late first-round pick for the opportunity to add veteran Rudy Fernandez to their championship core. For a team on Dallas’ timeline, the immediacy of such a move makes sense; there’s an allure in a proven N.B.A. rotation player over an untested prospect, even if some of the prospects available (Texas’ Jordan Hamilton, who was once viewed as a talent worthy of the late lottery, chief among them) have intriguing long-term potential.
Even though acquiring Fernandez did not require sacrificing any piece of their existing core, the newest Maverick doesn’t come without his share of red flags. Fernandez is coming off of two consecutive disappointing seasons in Portland, souring the hype generated by his promising rookie campaign. His shooting efficiency over the last two years has plummeted, and though Fernandez is more than just a spot-up shooter, his ability to score and facilitate the offense are his most attractive qualities. Fernandez isn’t being brought to Dallas for his ability to bolster the Mavs’ defensive front.
That makes Fernandez’s poor shooting numbers (and thus, poor overall efficiency marks) tough to swallow, and makes the Mavs’ interest curios. What could draw Dallas enough to deflect Fernandez’s 37 percent shooting from the field last season, his 32 percent shooting from beyond the arc, and his iffy defense?
As it turns out, Dallas was sold based on a deeper look into more advanced statistical measures. According to Tim MacMahon of ESPN Dallas, Fernandez has posted exemplary marks in the Mavs’ in-house calculations of advanced plus-minus. Per MacMahon, Fernandez ranks in the top 20 players in the league by the team’s measure. That provides a bit of clarity; if Dallas’ statistical analysis shows Fernandez to have a hugely beneficial impact while he’s on the floor, then acquiring him for the cost of a late first-rounder was an absolute steal.
However, the publicly available advanced plus-minus data tells a very different story on Fernandez. BasketballValue.com is the go-to source for plus-minus data of both the adjusted and unadjusted varieties, and its records show a gloomier reflection of Fernandez’s last two N.B.A. seasons. The success of Fernandez’s rookie year was profound (he posted an advanced plus-minus of plus 6.96, which was indeed elite), but he followed that effort with a minus 1.28 mark in 2009-10 and a mere plus 0.66 mark this season.
Neither of those two most recent marks inspires confidence in Fernandez’s ability to be a legitimate difference-maker on scale with the Mavericks’ claims, but they also remind us of the powerful dividing wall that sits between team statisticians and those on the outside. The adjustments made in order to calculate advanced plus-minus bear the potential for very different results even though they rely on the same raw data. For that reason, the Mavericks’ advanced plus-minus may be –- and apparently is, in this case -– drastically different from that of non-team sources. There are some elements of the statistical world that are easily congruent between teams, media, and fans, but in cases like this one, we rely on a coincidental vocabulary to discuss entirely different evaluative measures. The advanced plus-minus available to us simply isn’t the same as the system used by the Mavericks, and the Mavericks’ system likely isn’t the same as that used by any other statistically inclined team.
All of which makes understanding the rationale behind personnel decisions more complicated. Every trade, free agent signing and draft selection naturally feeds into analysis of whether that particular move is inherently good or bad, but a more complete understanding of N.B.A. transactions requires a better grasp of each individual team’s motivations. It isn’t all about the final result; we should naturally strive to know what numbers, skills, and traits teams are looking for as they target and pursue talent, and their calculus in weighing those factors. The N.B.A.’s statistical revolution has more people than ever looking at the right kinds of data in the right ways, but it has also introduced a false sense of uniformity in the way that things like advanced plus-minus are presented.
The basic language is the same, but the dialectical differences within the statistical community create an incredible number of distinct perspectives. One of those perspectives may say that Fernandez was a relatively neutral influence last season, and another –- according to long-time Mavericks stats consultant Wayne Winston, who claims that his advanced plus-minus system influenced Dallas’ decision making -– that Fernandez was a huge benefit to the Blazers even in what was perceived as a down year. It’s difficult to say which formula is more accurate, but in this case, we’re at least privy to a bit of insight that drove Donnie Nelson and Mark Cuban to make a deal. Thanks to a line of questioning and a blog post, we’re able to trace the logic of the move back to the data. The entire process isn’t transparent enough for a complete understanding of Fernandez’s allure to the Mavericks (or rather, what makes him stand out in their statistical system), but there’s definite value in knowing the types of motivating factors that drives teams like the Mavericks to do what they do.
[/quote]
[quote author="http://offthedribble.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/same-numbers-two-views-of-fernandez/"]Same Numbers, Two Views of Fernandez
By Rob Mahoney
On draft night, the Dallas Mavericks traded away a late first-round pick for the opportunity to add veteran Rudy Fernandez to their championship core. For a team on Dallas’ timeline, the immediacy of such a move makes sense; there’s an allure in a proven N.B.A. rotation player over an untested prospect, even if some of the prospects available (Texas’ Jordan Hamilton, who was once viewed as a talent worthy of the late lottery, chief among them) have intriguing long-term potential.
Even though acquiring Fernandez did not require sacrificing any piece of their existing core, the newest Maverick doesn’t come without his share of red flags. Fernandez is coming off of two consecutive disappointing seasons in Portland, souring the hype generated by his promising rookie campaign. His shooting efficiency over the last two years has plummeted, and though Fernandez is more than just a spot-up shooter, his ability to score and facilitate the offense are his most attractive qualities. Fernandez isn’t being brought to Dallas for his ability to bolster the Mavs’ defensive front.
That makes Fernandez’s poor shooting numbers (and thus, poor overall efficiency marks) tough to swallow, and makes the Mavs’ interest curios. What could draw Dallas enough to deflect Fernandez’s 37 percent shooting from the field last season, his 32 percent shooting from beyond the arc, and his iffy defense?
As it turns out, Dallas was sold based on a deeper look into more advanced statistical measures. According to Tim MacMahon of ESPN Dallas, Fernandez has posted exemplary marks in the Mavs’ in-house calculations of advanced plus-minus. Per MacMahon, Fernandez ranks in the top 20 players in the league by the team’s measure. That provides a bit of clarity; if Dallas’ statistical analysis shows Fernandez to have a hugely beneficial impact while he’s on the floor, then acquiring him for the cost of a late first-rounder was an absolute steal.
However, the publicly available advanced plus-minus data tells a very different story on Fernandez. BasketballValue.com is the go-to source for plus-minus data of both the adjusted and unadjusted varieties, and its records show a gloomier reflection of Fernandez’s last two N.B.A. seasons. The success of Fernandez’s rookie year was profound (he posted an advanced plus-minus of plus 6.96, which was indeed elite), but he followed that effort with a minus 1.28 mark in 2009-10 and a mere plus 0.66 mark this season.
Neither of those two most recent marks inspires confidence in Fernandez’s ability to be a legitimate difference-maker on scale with the Mavericks’ claims, but they also remind us of the powerful dividing wall that sits between team statisticians and those on the outside. The adjustments made in order to calculate advanced plus-minus bear the potential for very different results even though they rely on the same raw data. For that reason, the Mavericks’ advanced plus-minus may be –- and apparently is, in this case -– drastically different from that of non-team sources. There are some elements of the statistical world that are easily congruent between teams, media, and fans, but in cases like this one, we rely on a coincidental vocabulary to discuss entirely different evaluative measures. The advanced plus-minus available to us simply isn’t the same as the system used by the Mavericks, and the Mavericks’ system likely isn’t the same as that used by any other statistically inclined team.
All of which makes understanding the rationale behind personnel decisions more complicated. Every trade, free agent signing and draft selection naturally feeds into analysis of whether that particular move is inherently good or bad, but a more complete understanding of N.B.A. transactions requires a better grasp of each individual team’s motivations. It isn’t all about the final result; we should naturally strive to know what numbers, skills, and traits teams are looking for as they target and pursue talent, and their calculus in weighing those factors. The N.B.A.’s statistical revolution has more people than ever looking at the right kinds of data in the right ways, but it has also introduced a false sense of uniformity in the way that things like advanced plus-minus are presented.
The basic language is the same, but the dialectical differences within the statistical community create an incredible number of distinct perspectives. One of those perspectives may say that Fernandez was a relatively neutral influence last season, and another –- according to long-time Mavericks stats consultant Wayne Winston, who claims that his advanced plus-minus system influenced Dallas’ decision making -– that Fernandez was a huge benefit to the Blazers even in what was perceived as a down year. It’s difficult to say which formula is more accurate, but in this case, we’re at least privy to a bit of insight that drove Donnie Nelson and Mark Cuban to make a deal. Thanks to a line of questioning and a blog post, we’re able to trace the logic of the move back to the data. The entire process isn’t transparent enough for a complete understanding of Fernandez’s allure to the Mavericks (or rather, what makes him stand out in their statistical system), but there’s definite value in knowing the types of motivating factors that drives teams like the Mavericks to do what they do.
[/quote]
